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本文运用我国上市商业银行的经验证据来考察商业银行经营绩效与高级管理人员激励的关系。结果显示前三名高管薪酬与商业银行业绩呈负相关关系;管理层持股比例均与商业银行业绩呈正相关关系;相比总资产收益率,每股盈余与管理层激励的关系则更为显著;负债比率与企业绩效呈负相关,说明债权约束可以减少管理层的逆向选择和道德风险,从而提高企业绩效;第二到第五大股东的持股比例之和与企业绩效成正相关关系,说明股权制衡对抑制大股东的利益输送行为有显著的监督作用。
This paper uses the empirical evidence of listed commercial banks in our country to examine the relationship between the commercial banks’ performance and the incentive of senior managers. The results show that the top three executive pay is negatively correlated with the performance of commercial banks; the proportion of management shareholding is positively correlated with the performance of commercial banks; compared with total assets return, the relationship between earnings per share and management incentives is more Significant; the debt ratio is negatively correlated with corporate performance, indicating that debt constraints can reduce the management’s adverse selection and moral hazard, thereby enhancing corporate performance; the second to the fifth largest shareholder of the proportion of shares and corporate performance has a positive correlation, It shows that the balance of stock rights has a significant supervisory role in restraining the interests of major shareholders.