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以2002～2005年我国发行A股的上市公司为研究对象,探讨了不同“品质”的企业在投资者与企业以及企业与监管机构的双重委托代理契约中不同程度的道德风险,以及我国的市场化程度对企业履约的影响。实证研究表明,政府控制与募集资金投向变更的几率和程度显著负相关;民营控制与募集资金投向变更的几率和程度正相关;央企比地企有更少的动机和更低的程度变更募集资金投向;无政治关系的民企比有政治关系的民企有更强的动机变更募集资金投向,但有更低的变更募集资金投向的程度;市场化程度越高,募集资金投向变更的几率和程度越高。
Taking the listed companies issuing A shares in China from 2002 to 2005 as the research object, this paper explores the different degrees of moral hazard in different contractual contracts between investors and enterprises, enterprises and regulators, The degree of marketization on the performance of enterprises. Empirical studies show that there is a significant negative correlation between the government control and the probability and extent of the changes in the funds raised. Private control is positively related to the probability and degree of the changes in the funds raised. Central enterprises have less motivation and have a lower degree of change than raised funds Investment; non-political relations between private enterprises than the political relations have more motivation to change the funding to raise funds, but there is a lower degree of change to raise funds to invest; the higher the degree of marketization, raised funds to change the probability and degree of the more high.