本文通过理论模型和大样本数据研究了证券分析师发布盈余预测时存在的利益冲突问题。我们发现管理层、证券公司和分析师自身对盈余预测准确性都有显著的影响,这些影响在统计意义和经济意义上都是显著的,并且分析师自身的影响要比证券公司的影响更大。而且,机构投资者持股比例越高,分析师的盈余预测准确度会越低。进一步,我们也发现分析师自身对盈余预测准确性的影响很少一部分是被可观察到的分析师个人特征(比如性别、学历、相关工作经验、声誉、教育背景)解释,大部分都是被一些不可观察的或者难以计量的个人特征影响。我们的研究强调从管理层层面、证券公司层面和分析师个人层面来分析盈余预测准确性的重要性。 In this paper, we study the conflicts of interest existing in securities analysts’ earnings forecasts through theoretical models and large sample data. We find that management, securities firms and analysts themselves have a significant impact on the accuracy of earnings forecasts, both statistically significant and economically significant, and the impact of analysts themselves is greater than that of securities firms . Moreover, the higher the institutional investor ownership ratio, the lower the analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy. Further, we also find that the analyst’s own little influence on the accuracy of earnings forecast is explained by the observable personal characteristics of analysts (such as gender, academic qualifications, relevant work experience, reputation, educational background), and most of them are Some unobservable or difficult to measure personal characteristics. Our research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the accuracy of earnings forecasts from the management level, the securities firm level and the analyst personal level.