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本文对国外的代理成本、多元化经营和企业价值理论加以利用、改造和创新,构建出符合我国上市公司治理结构的“一股独大”下多元化经营效率模型,提出具有原创性的“多元化程度与大股东控股比例呈双曲线特征关系”和“公司价值和多元化程度的关系取决于大股东控股比例”两个命题,然后通过对1999年年底前上市.的1026家公司在2000—2006年间的财务报表进行深入细致的调研,运用混合截面回归和系统广义矩法对模型进行实证检验,发现企业多元化的动因在于经理人能够从中获得私有收益;多元化程度是经理人私人收益激励的IHI性增函数,是大股东持股比例的凸性减函数。本文的实证结果表明,在大股东持股比例较高的情况下,经理人追求多元化的私有收益使得多元化经营损害了公司价值,是造成公司预期价值与多元化程度呈负相关关系的原因。
In this paper, the foreign agency costs, diversification and enterprise value theory to make use of, reform and innovation, in line with the governance structure of listed companies in China “a dominant ” under the diversification of efficiency model, put forward original “The degree of diversification and the proportion of large shareholders holding a hyperbolic relationship ” and “The relationship between the value of the company and the degree of diversification depends on the proportion of controlling shareholder ” two propositions, and then by the end of 1999 listed. 1026 companies carried out in-depth and meticulous research on the financial statements from 2000 to 2006, and used empirical test to test the model by means of hybrid cross-section regression and system generalized moment method. It found that motivation for diversification of enterprises lies in that managers can obtain private benefits from them; degree of diversification It is the IHI increase function of managers’ personal income incentive, and it is the convex decreasing function of the proportion of large shareholders. The empirical results of this paper show that the diversification of private earnings by managers in the case of a high proportion of large shareholders’ shareholding makes the diversification damage the value of the company, which is the reason that the expected value of the company is negatively correlated with the degree of diversification .