论文部分内容阅读
本文研究产权保护较弱的环境下,民营化过程中控制权提前交接的经济后果。基于173家中国国有控股上市公司民营化的数据,本文发现,与控制权未提前交接相比,控制权提前交接的公司更可能被民营收购方掏空,民营化绩效更差;并且这一现象主要表现在民营化前盈利能力较好的公司。本文还发现,随着监管措施加强,2004年后民营化的公司,控制权提前交接的现象不再普遍,收购方也更多地是有创业经验的民营企业家,相应地,掏空行为明显减少,民营化绩效更好。对收购方来说,提前获得控制权,意味着较低的交易成本。本文的证据表明,降低交易成本(即允许提前交接),反而损害了民营化绩效。本文提供了有关民营化交易过程如何影响民营化后果的经验证据,丰富了产权保护与交易成本的文献:对于实行民营化政策,也具有一定的借鉴意义。
This paper studies the economic consequences of early handover of control in the process of privatization in the context of weaker property rights protection. Based on the data on the privatization of 173 state-owned listed companies in China, this paper finds that, compared with the control not handed over in advance, the companies whose control rights are handed over in advance are more likely to be emptied by private acquirers and the privatization performance is worse; and this phenomenon Mainly in the pre-privatization company with better profitability. The paper also finds that with the strengthening of regulatory measures, the privatization of the companies after 2004 is not commonplace for the transfer of control rights in advance, and the acquirer is also more a private entrepreneur with entrepreneurial experience. Accordingly, the tunneling behavior is obvious Reduce the privatization performance better. For acquirers, getting control ahead of time means lower transaction costs. The evidence in this article shows that lowering transaction costs (ie allowing early handovers) on the contrary undermines privatization performance. This article provides empirical evidence on how the privatization process affects privatization and enriches the literature on property rights protection and transaction costs: It also has some implications for the implementation of privatization policies.