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本文基于信息不完全的前提假设从“生产风险”和“交易风险”两个方面对Yang和Ng(1995)的企业交易效率演进模型进行了扩展,并证明出国有企业低效率的临界交易效率条件:当交易效率较低时,生产风险成本较高,那么国有企业的产权安排将因为有利于节约生产风险成本而促进经济增长;反之,交易风险成本较高,于是民营企业将因为有利于节约交易风险成本而促进经济增长。进一步,本文利用面板门限技术和1985~2009年的省级面板数据对上述命题进行了验证,结论很好验证了上述思想。这就意味着谨慎看待国有企业双重效率损失(本身的低效率和进一步的增长拖累)的重要性,国有企业的低效率需要以市场(交易效率)的高效率为前提,即:当存在着市场失灵或缺失时,国有企业仍旧不失为一种有效率的产权结构并促进经济增长。
Based on the assumption of incomplete information, this paper extends Yang and Ng’s (1995) model of enterprise transaction efficiency evolution from two aspects of “production risk” and “transaction risk”, and proves that inefficient state-owned enterprises The critical transaction efficiency conditions: when the transaction efficiency is low, the production risk cost is high, then the property rights arrangements of state-owned enterprises will promote economic growth because it is conducive to saving production risk costs; on the contrary, the transaction risk cost is high, so private enterprises will because of It helps to save the transaction risk and promote economic growth. Further, in this paper, panel threshold technology and provincial panel data from 1985 to 2009 were used to verify the above propositions. The conclusion proves the above idea well. This implies careful attention to the importance of double efficiency losses in state-owned enterprises (their own inefficiencies and further growth dragdowns). The inefficiency of state-owned enterprises needs to be premised on the high efficiency of the market (transaction efficiency): when there is a market In the event of failure or failure, state-owned enterprises are still an efficient structure of property rights and promote economic growth.