论文部分内容阅读
长期以来,区分普通侵占罪与盗窃罪的关键被认为在于确定事前财物由谁占有。然而现实的情况却表明,这种看似清楚的区分逻辑将我们带入一种难以相互说服的“明希豪森困局”当中。如果我们转换思路,从立法者将普通侵占罪设定为绝对的亲告罪这一前提出发进行求索,可以发现,普通侵占罪的成立是以被害人具备依靠私力救济追索或者请求补偿的法律可能性为基本条件的。以此推论得到的两罪界分关键不再是事前的财产占有权属状态,而是行为人的侵害行为是否具有损害被害人自力救济法律可能的类型化特征,即行为人的行为具有侵害自力救济法律可能的类型性特征,不管事前财产由谁占有,都成立盗窃罪而不再属于侵占罪的规制范围。
For a long time, the key to distinguishing between ordinary embezzlement and theft was considered to be the determination of who owes the ex ante property. However, the reality shows that this seemingly clear logic of distinction brings us into a difficult position to persuade each other to find out. If we change our thinking and proceed from the premise of legislator setting ordinary embezzlement crime as absolute pro-condemnation, we can find that the establishment of ordinary embezzlement crime is based on the law that the victim has the right to resort to private remedies or to seek compensation Possibilities are basic conditions. Therefore, the key point of the two crimes deducted is no longer antecedent property possession status, but whether the perpetrator’s infringement has the possible typological feature that undermines the victim’s self-help remedy, that is, the behavior of the perpetrator has self-help remedy The possible typological features of law, regardless of who is in possession of the property in advance, establish a system of theft without ceasing to be an instrument of embezzlement.