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In early December 1995， snow had just fallen on Beijing and the temperature was minus ten degrees centigrade. Amidst the freezing cold of winter， some ninety thousand rural migrants living in the city’s southern suburbs were undergoing a life-shattering event. Under pressure from a government campaign targeted specifically at them， these people， mostly petty entrepreneurs and traders from rural Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province， were suddenly forced to abandon their homes and leave the city. Over a period of less than two weeks， about half of these migrants were driven into Beijing’s remotest areas and surrounding rural counties. All of their forty-eight large housing compounds were demolished， flattened by yellow government bulldozers and turned into piles of debris. A once lively migrant community with a flourishing private economy suddenly resembled the bombed-out remnants of a war zone.
This government campaign to clean up a prominent migrant community in Beijing was part of a larger fierce and ongoing battle over space， power， and social order. With rapid commercialization and a booming urban economy in the post-Mao era， nearly 100 million peasants have left the rural hinterlands to seek employment and business opportunities in China’s urban centers. This enormous group of people on the move is known as the floating population （liudong renkou）， a by-product of economic reform and China’s entry into the orbit of global capitalism.
Although the floating population consists of people with diverse socioeconomic and regional backgrounds， their primary goals are the same： to make money and get rich in the cities. Some of these rural transients are able to bring a small amount of capital with them to start small businesses and exploit the huge potential of the urban consumer market. Indeed， some of them have accumulated a considerable amount of new wealth. But the majority of peasant workers who come to the cities have nothing but their labor to sell. The lucky ones manage to find temporary menial work in construction， restaurants， factories， domestic services， street cleaning， and other jobs that most urbanities are not willing to take. Still， there are many others who cannot find anything to do and thus drift hopelessly from place to place. Even though rural migrants are not entitled to the same legal rights as permanent urban residents and are subject to pervasive discrimination and periodic expulsion， large numbers of them arrive in the cities every day to pursue their dreams of prosperity. While emerging market forces open up new ways for peasants to break through the constraints of the household registration （hukou） system to work and trade in the cities， multiple layers of social and political tensions exist between migrant newcomers， the state， and urban society. Despite the fact that the cheap labor and services provided by rural migrants are in high demand in cities， migrants are regarded as a serious social problem by urban officials and residents. The floating population is seen as a drain on already scarce urban public resources and is blamed for increased crime and social instability. Too far away to be reached by rural authorities but not yet incorporated into the urban control system， rural migrants are considered“out of place” and “out of control.” The very existence of this large， mobile， and unmanageable population has called into question the old Chinese socialist control based on a relatively stable population fixed in space. Moreover， the recent formation of “congregating zones of floaters” （liudong renkou jujudian） is even more disturbing to top leaders and city officials， who believe that the “political vacuum” formed in such places can easily become fertile ground for the growth of social vices and nonstate political forces. Therefore， as mass migration led to the formation of community-based migrant power， the state developed new strategies to regulate the migrants.
This book is an ethnographic study of the development， destruction， and eventual reconstruction of an emerging nonstate-organized migrant community under late socialism. By “late socialism” I mean the historical moment in which Chinese society is undergoing a profound transformation under multiple socioeconomic forces： accelerating marketization and privatization， entrenchment of global capital， and lingering socialist institutions and practices. The community I focus on in this study is Zhejiangcun （Zhejiang Village）， the largest migrant settlement in Beijing. The majority of migrants living in this southern suburban community are peasants-turned-entrepreneurs whose family businesses specialize in garment manufacturing and trade. By examining the politics of the making， unmaking， and remaking of this migrant community， I seek to explore how space， power， and identity-reformation intersect to reconfigure the state-society relationship in a period of increased spatial mobility and marketization. Therefore， this book can be also read as an ethnography of changing Chinese state-society relationships under late socialism. More specifically， the book addresses the follow- ing interrelated questions： How does the late-socialist state attempt to turn rural migrants into a distinct kind of subject for new forms of control and regulation？ What kinds of social networks do rural migrants mobilize to create their social space and popular leadership in the city？ What are the social and political ramifications of the informal privatization of space and power within the migrant population？ How can we re-conceptualize the reform-era Chinese state in order to make sense of the dissimilar responses from diverse state agencies to profound social and spatial changes brought by migrants？
I probe the above questions in the following ways： First， I place the production of social space by migrant entrepreneurs at the center of my ethnographic inquiry to illuminate their struggle to negotiate a third kind of state-society relationship in China， one that is outside the strictly rural or urban mode of state-society dynamics. I argue that it is primarily through the spatial and social production of a migrant community （manifested in the construction of private housing and marketplace） that a new form of migrant power and leadership has emerged and developed. Put in more abstract terms， the production of social space is conditioned by the existing power relations and itself constitutes a vital source of power. But as I show in the chapters that follow， although locality-based migrant power no doubt challenges the state monopoly of production， trade， and community life， it is nevertheless deeply intertwined with officialdom through informal patronage ties.
Second， this book provides an ethnographic account of how pervasive clientelist alliances developed between three vertically positioned groups： local officials， migrant leaders， and ordinary migrant families. In this emerging realm of commercial and political clientelism， migrant leaders act as “local bosses” or “political brokers” to regulate market order and communal life， while negotiating with the state for migrants’ rights to live， work， and trade in the city. I maintain that the making of such triadic clientelist ties in migrant communities is not merely a revival of traditional forms of social networks such as cliques and gangs； rather， these clientelist alliances created by migrants are highly commodified and have enabled a new mode of governmentality in managing a third kind of subjects – the floating population （neither strictly rural nor urban） in China. Here I use the term “governmentality” to refer to the art or strategies of governing practices that aim to shape， guide， and affect the mind and conduct of persons through multilevel social domains such as the family， community， discourse， and other social institutions （see Foucault 1991 and Gordon 1991； see also Ong 1999）. Third， while analyzing the ongoing reconfiguration of social and spatial relations within this community and its relationship with the state， I situate a locally grounded analysis in the larger geopolitics of the capital， Beijing. The geopolitics of Beijing is determined by its unique political and symbolic position in the Chinese national order of things. A number of questions are germane to political leaders’ concerns： How should residential communities be organized and on whose terms？ What kinds of private capital， production， and trade should be allowed in a place like Beijing？ How should the relationship between political control and economic gains be balanced to ensure greater political stability？ These questions are derived from the state’s increasing concern about how to maintain its political control and implement its vision of a new socioeconomic order.
Thriving unofficial migrant communities have exacerbated bureaucrats’ political anxieties about their ability to sustain the power to regulate emerging regimes of private economy and alternative residential communities. This is because， based on kinship and native-place networks， many migrant groups have constituted themselves as separate communities with their own leadership and a strong sense of regional identity. Further， with the increase of housing demands and capital accumulation， some larger， wealthy migrant groups have constructed semipermanent housing and marketplaces， which has profoundly altered the spatial organization and power dynamics in parts of Chinese cities. Such informal privatization of power and space within the migrant population creates multiple local centers of power that compete with the once-monopolizing state power.
In the early 1990s the perceived political danger from the migrant settlement Zhejiangcun was particularly acute because of its location only five kilometers from China’s political center – Beijing’s Tian’anmen Square. Moreover， sweatshop-like， labor-intensive cottage industries operated by Wenzhou migrants and their fortress-like housing compounds appeared too messy and disorderly to city officials. The enclave was thus deemed incompatible with the type of development that the post-Mao regime wished to promote in the capital： that is， high-tech development， large corporate commerce， and managed foreign investment. In other words， rural migrants’ cottage industries ran counter to what I call the “late-socialist urban aesthetics” promoted by the state to attract foreign investment and international and domestic tourism. Fourth， this study focuses on migrant entrepreneurs rather than migrant workers. Migrant entrepreneurs can be compared to what Gates （1996） defines as“petty capitalists” because they operate family-based businesses by using preaccumulated small capital and extended kinship ties. In contrast， migrant workers （dagongde or mingong） have nothing but their labor to sell and depend heavily on the urban labor market for work. As small manufacturers and traders with economic resources， the entrepreneurs have a distinct advantage over migrant workers in that they are able to create native-place-based enclaves， better social connections， and business flexibility.
My account of Chinese migrants’ production of social space and creation of clientelist networks challenges two assumptions frequently echoed in popular Western discourse on postsocialist transitions： “the retreat of the state” and “the triumph of the market and capitalism.” These assumptions present a vision of （post）socialist transition as a progressive and unilinear move toward a known end： liberal capitalism and democratic politics. They further assume that the disintegration of socialist regimes and their opening up to market capitalism will automatically lead to a withering of state power （usually represented as evil and oppressive）， and that such a retreat will necessarily lead to the formation of egalitarian and democratic social spaces.
Strangers in the City： Reconfiguring Space， Power， and Social Networks of China’s Floating Population
by Li Zhang （USA）， translated by Yuan Changgeng， Jiangsu People’s Publishing House， January 2014
This book is a study of the profound reconfigurations of politics and economics as well as a reproduction of culture in modern China resulting from massive internal labor migration since the country’s implementation of reform and opening-up policies： Within 30 years， over 200 million farmers have left their homes， seeking jobs and entrepreneurship in urban areas. It depicts how labor migration has resulted in the reconfiguration of space and social relations as well as the establishment of networks among regions. Li Zhang， the author， illustrates the transformation of the model of social governance and the challenges of traditional governing created by private social space in China since the 1980s， through stories of the development， prosperity， removal， and reconstruction of “Zhejiang Village” in Beijing’s Fengtai District， a typical community mainly inhabited by transplants. She also challenges the reductionism of“market victory， country retreat”and insists on understanding modern China’s “nation-society”relationship through observing more complicated daily practices and ongoing changes. Li Zhang， an AmericanChinese anthropologist， works as Chancellor’s Fellow at the University of California， Davis， and a professor of anthropology specializing in urban anthropology， population mobility， middle class and its consumption， and post-socialism. Over the last few years， she has also published other books， including In Search of Paradise： Middle Class Living in a Chinese Metropolis （Cornell University Press， 2010）.
Study on Masterpieces of Chinese Painting
by Li Lincan， Zhejiang University Press， January 2014
It took 20 years for Li Lincan to finish this book， his magnum opus. The author studied every piece of masterpieces such as Portraits of Periodical Offering by Xiao Yi （508-554） and Traveling amid Mountains and Streams by Fan Kuan （？-1031）， completing a comprehensive overview of the composition of landscape paintings of the Song Dynasty （960-1279）. He eventually developed new concepts and solutions for various issues， contributing greatly to the study of the history of traditional Chinese painting. The book contains 91 illustrations of masterpieces of Chinese painting， most from the collection of the Taipei National Palace Museum.
Li Lincan （1913-1999）， former deputy curator of the Taipei National Palace Museum， is a noted historian of art， a relic connoisseur， and an anthropologist. All his life， Li devoted himself to the investigation and research of Naxi scripts along the border area of Yunnan Province as well as appreciating Chinese calligraphy and painting， studying ancient Chinese painting and its history scientifically by blending inherent art of relics with aesthetics of life， making remarkable contributions to artistic education. His other titles available on the Chinese mainland include The Beauty of Art， Art in China， and Snowy Mountains and West Lake.
This government campaign to clean up a prominent migrant community in Beijing was part of a larger fierce and ongoing battle over space， power， and social order. With rapid commercialization and a booming urban economy in the post-Mao era， nearly 100 million peasants have left the rural hinterlands to seek employment and business opportunities in China’s urban centers. This enormous group of people on the move is known as the floating population （liudong renkou）， a by-product of economic reform and China’s entry into the orbit of global capitalism.
Although the floating population consists of people with diverse socioeconomic and regional backgrounds， their primary goals are the same： to make money and get rich in the cities. Some of these rural transients are able to bring a small amount of capital with them to start small businesses and exploit the huge potential of the urban consumer market. Indeed， some of them have accumulated a considerable amount of new wealth. But the majority of peasant workers who come to the cities have nothing but their labor to sell. The lucky ones manage to find temporary menial work in construction， restaurants， factories， domestic services， street cleaning， and other jobs that most urbanities are not willing to take. Still， there are many others who cannot find anything to do and thus drift hopelessly from place to place. Even though rural migrants are not entitled to the same legal rights as permanent urban residents and are subject to pervasive discrimination and periodic expulsion， large numbers of them arrive in the cities every day to pursue their dreams of prosperity. While emerging market forces open up new ways for peasants to break through the constraints of the household registration （hukou） system to work and trade in the cities， multiple layers of social and political tensions exist between migrant newcomers， the state， and urban society. Despite the fact that the cheap labor and services provided by rural migrants are in high demand in cities， migrants are regarded as a serious social problem by urban officials and residents. The floating population is seen as a drain on already scarce urban public resources and is blamed for increased crime and social instability. Too far away to be reached by rural authorities but not yet incorporated into the urban control system， rural migrants are considered“out of place” and “out of control.” The very existence of this large， mobile， and unmanageable population has called into question the old Chinese socialist control based on a relatively stable population fixed in space. Moreover， the recent formation of “congregating zones of floaters” （liudong renkou jujudian） is even more disturbing to top leaders and city officials， who believe that the “political vacuum” formed in such places can easily become fertile ground for the growth of social vices and nonstate political forces. Therefore， as mass migration led to the formation of community-based migrant power， the state developed new strategies to regulate the migrants.
This book is an ethnographic study of the development， destruction， and eventual reconstruction of an emerging nonstate-organized migrant community under late socialism. By “late socialism” I mean the historical moment in which Chinese society is undergoing a profound transformation under multiple socioeconomic forces： accelerating marketization and privatization， entrenchment of global capital， and lingering socialist institutions and practices. The community I focus on in this study is Zhejiangcun （Zhejiang Village）， the largest migrant settlement in Beijing. The majority of migrants living in this southern suburban community are peasants-turned-entrepreneurs whose family businesses specialize in garment manufacturing and trade. By examining the politics of the making， unmaking， and remaking of this migrant community， I seek to explore how space， power， and identity-reformation intersect to reconfigure the state-society relationship in a period of increased spatial mobility and marketization. Therefore， this book can be also read as an ethnography of changing Chinese state-society relationships under late socialism. More specifically， the book addresses the follow- ing interrelated questions： How does the late-socialist state attempt to turn rural migrants into a distinct kind of subject for new forms of control and regulation？ What kinds of social networks do rural migrants mobilize to create their social space and popular leadership in the city？ What are the social and political ramifications of the informal privatization of space and power within the migrant population？ How can we re-conceptualize the reform-era Chinese state in order to make sense of the dissimilar responses from diverse state agencies to profound social and spatial changes brought by migrants？
I probe the above questions in the following ways： First， I place the production of social space by migrant entrepreneurs at the center of my ethnographic inquiry to illuminate their struggle to negotiate a third kind of state-society relationship in China， one that is outside the strictly rural or urban mode of state-society dynamics. I argue that it is primarily through the spatial and social production of a migrant community （manifested in the construction of private housing and marketplace） that a new form of migrant power and leadership has emerged and developed. Put in more abstract terms， the production of social space is conditioned by the existing power relations and itself constitutes a vital source of power. But as I show in the chapters that follow， although locality-based migrant power no doubt challenges the state monopoly of production， trade， and community life， it is nevertheless deeply intertwined with officialdom through informal patronage ties.
Second， this book provides an ethnographic account of how pervasive clientelist alliances developed between three vertically positioned groups： local officials， migrant leaders， and ordinary migrant families. In this emerging realm of commercial and political clientelism， migrant leaders act as “local bosses” or “political brokers” to regulate market order and communal life， while negotiating with the state for migrants’ rights to live， work， and trade in the city. I maintain that the making of such triadic clientelist ties in migrant communities is not merely a revival of traditional forms of social networks such as cliques and gangs； rather， these clientelist alliances created by migrants are highly commodified and have enabled a new mode of governmentality in managing a third kind of subjects – the floating population （neither strictly rural nor urban） in China. Here I use the term “governmentality” to refer to the art or strategies of governing practices that aim to shape， guide， and affect the mind and conduct of persons through multilevel social domains such as the family， community， discourse， and other social institutions （see Foucault 1991 and Gordon 1991； see also Ong 1999）. Third， while analyzing the ongoing reconfiguration of social and spatial relations within this community and its relationship with the state， I situate a locally grounded analysis in the larger geopolitics of the capital， Beijing. The geopolitics of Beijing is determined by its unique political and symbolic position in the Chinese national order of things. A number of questions are germane to political leaders’ concerns： How should residential communities be organized and on whose terms？ What kinds of private capital， production， and trade should be allowed in a place like Beijing？ How should the relationship between political control and economic gains be balanced to ensure greater political stability？ These questions are derived from the state’s increasing concern about how to maintain its political control and implement its vision of a new socioeconomic order.
Thriving unofficial migrant communities have exacerbated bureaucrats’ political anxieties about their ability to sustain the power to regulate emerging regimes of private economy and alternative residential communities. This is because， based on kinship and native-place networks， many migrant groups have constituted themselves as separate communities with their own leadership and a strong sense of regional identity. Further， with the increase of housing demands and capital accumulation， some larger， wealthy migrant groups have constructed semipermanent housing and marketplaces， which has profoundly altered the spatial organization and power dynamics in parts of Chinese cities. Such informal privatization of power and space within the migrant population creates multiple local centers of power that compete with the once-monopolizing state power.
In the early 1990s the perceived political danger from the migrant settlement Zhejiangcun was particularly acute because of its location only five kilometers from China’s political center – Beijing’s Tian’anmen Square. Moreover， sweatshop-like， labor-intensive cottage industries operated by Wenzhou migrants and their fortress-like housing compounds appeared too messy and disorderly to city officials. The enclave was thus deemed incompatible with the type of development that the post-Mao regime wished to promote in the capital： that is， high-tech development， large corporate commerce， and managed foreign investment. In other words， rural migrants’ cottage industries ran counter to what I call the “late-socialist urban aesthetics” promoted by the state to attract foreign investment and international and domestic tourism. Fourth， this study focuses on migrant entrepreneurs rather than migrant workers. Migrant entrepreneurs can be compared to what Gates （1996） defines as“petty capitalists” because they operate family-based businesses by using preaccumulated small capital and extended kinship ties. In contrast， migrant workers （dagongde or mingong） have nothing but their labor to sell and depend heavily on the urban labor market for work. As small manufacturers and traders with economic resources， the entrepreneurs have a distinct advantage over migrant workers in that they are able to create native-place-based enclaves， better social connections， and business flexibility.
My account of Chinese migrants’ production of social space and creation of clientelist networks challenges two assumptions frequently echoed in popular Western discourse on postsocialist transitions： “the retreat of the state” and “the triumph of the market and capitalism.” These assumptions present a vision of （post）socialist transition as a progressive and unilinear move toward a known end： liberal capitalism and democratic politics. They further assume that the disintegration of socialist regimes and their opening up to market capitalism will automatically lead to a withering of state power （usually represented as evil and oppressive）， and that such a retreat will necessarily lead to the formation of egalitarian and democratic social spaces.
Strangers in the City： Reconfiguring Space， Power， and Social Networks of China’s Floating Population
by Li Zhang （USA）， translated by Yuan Changgeng， Jiangsu People’s Publishing House， January 2014
This book is a study of the profound reconfigurations of politics and economics as well as a reproduction of culture in modern China resulting from massive internal labor migration since the country’s implementation of reform and opening-up policies： Within 30 years， over 200 million farmers have left their homes， seeking jobs and entrepreneurship in urban areas. It depicts how labor migration has resulted in the reconfiguration of space and social relations as well as the establishment of networks among regions. Li Zhang， the author， illustrates the transformation of the model of social governance and the challenges of traditional governing created by private social space in China since the 1980s， through stories of the development， prosperity， removal， and reconstruction of “Zhejiang Village” in Beijing’s Fengtai District， a typical community mainly inhabited by transplants. She also challenges the reductionism of“market victory， country retreat”and insists on understanding modern China’s “nation-society”relationship through observing more complicated daily practices and ongoing changes. Li Zhang， an AmericanChinese anthropologist， works as Chancellor’s Fellow at the University of California， Davis， and a professor of anthropology specializing in urban anthropology， population mobility， middle class and its consumption， and post-socialism. Over the last few years， she has also published other books， including In Search of Paradise： Middle Class Living in a Chinese Metropolis （Cornell University Press， 2010）.
Study on Masterpieces of Chinese Painting
by Li Lincan， Zhejiang University Press， January 2014
It took 20 years for Li Lincan to finish this book， his magnum opus. The author studied every piece of masterpieces such as Portraits of Periodical Offering by Xiao Yi （508-554） and Traveling amid Mountains and Streams by Fan Kuan （？-1031）， completing a comprehensive overview of the composition of landscape paintings of the Song Dynasty （960-1279）. He eventually developed new concepts and solutions for various issues， contributing greatly to the study of the history of traditional Chinese painting. The book contains 91 illustrations of masterpieces of Chinese painting， most from the collection of the Taipei National Palace Museum.
Li Lincan （1913-1999）， former deputy curator of the Taipei National Palace Museum， is a noted historian of art， a relic connoisseur， and an anthropologist. All his life， Li devoted himself to the investigation and research of Naxi scripts along the border area of Yunnan Province as well as appreciating Chinese calligraphy and painting， studying ancient Chinese painting and its history scientifically by blending inherent art of relics with aesthetics of life， making remarkable contributions to artistic education. His other titles available on the Chinese mainland include The Beauty of Art， Art in China， and Snowy Mountains and West Lake.