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股票期权作为一种激励经理人为股东利益努力工作的薪酬工具在上市公司中得到普遍采用。然而在现实操作层面,由于经理人权力能够在公司治理内部形成一定的影响,因此也暴露出期权制度的风险性。这些潜在的风险对于我国方兴未艾的薪酬激励实践来说,有的已经危害到分配机制的公平性,有的可能还是休眠中的火山。分析经理人权力对股票期权操作细节的影响,能够让风险呈现于损害之前,从而有利于采取有效的防范。
Stock options as a kind of salary tool that motivates managers to work hard for the interests of shareholders is widely used in listed companies. However, at the practical operation level, the risk of the option system is exposed because the manager’s power can exert certain influence inside the corporate governance. These potential risks for our country’s emerging pay incentive practice, some have jeopardized the fairness of the distribution mechanism, and some may be dormant volcano. Analyzing the impact of manager power on the details of the operation of stock options allows risk to be presented before it is compromised, thereby facilitating effective prevention.