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以经济分析为方法,通过构建行为模型并以行为模型为基础,对我国环境行政执法政策选择进行分析研究,以清楚认识我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结所在,并提出提高执法效率的基本途径和方法。基于理性经济人假设,环境违法行为会对影响预期违法成本与违法收益的因素做出反应,在环境行政执法中这一因素主要是行政罚款。个人行为模型和行政行为模型显示,我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结在于行政罚款中忽视制裁率问题,并导致行政执法不能产生较好的预防环境危害行为的效果,也导致社会福利的减损,使行政执法的社会效用不能最大化。最优的环境行政罚款政策应考虑罚款数额、制裁率和环境危害之间的相互依存关系。行政责任归责标准、风险偏好和边际效用也会对最优环境行政罚款政策选择产生影响。
Based on the method of economic analysis, through the construction of behavioral model and behavioral model, this paper analyzes and studies the policy choice of environmental administrative law enforcement in our country so as to clearly understand the crux of the inefficiency of environmental administrative law enforcement in our country and proposes the basic ways to enhance the efficiency of law enforcement And method. Based on the hypothesis of rational economic man, the environmental violations will respond to the factors that affect the expected illegal costs and the illegal gains. The main factor in environmental administrative law enforcement is administrative fines. The model of individual behavior and the model of administrative behavior show that the crux of the inefficiency of environmental administrative law enforcement in China is the neglect of the sanction rate in administrative fines and the ineffectiveness of administrative law enforcement in preventing environmental harm and the detriment of social welfare. So that the social effects of administrative law enforcement can not be maximized. The optimal environmental administrative fines policy should consider the interdependence between the amount of fines, sanctions rates and environmental hazards. Imputation criteria of administrative responsibility, risk appetite and marginal utility will also affect the choice of the optimal environmental administrative fines policy.