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为了应对当前经济增速的放缓,我国各级政府相继出台了一系列体现宏观调控经济增长目标的“稳增长”政策,其内在的政治逻辑是亨廷顿所谓的“政绩合法性”。根据该政治逻辑,“稳增长”政策成为实现这一合法性的政治手段。然而,宏观调控权专属于中央政府已是不争的事实,这表明当前主要由地方政府实施的“稳增长”政策已违反了宏观调控法的基本法理。当然,对“稳增长”政策的根本治理,还有待宏观调控法辅助性原则的确立,以及既得利益集团在宏观调控决策中作用的消解。
In order to cope with the current slowdown in economic growth, all levels of government in our country have promulgated a series of “steady growth” policies that reflect the objective of macro-control of economic growth. Their inherent political logic is Huntington’s so-called “political legitimacy” . According to this political logic, the policy of “steady growth” has become a political tool for achieving this legitimacy. However, it is an indisputable fact that the power of macroeconomic regulation and control is exclusively vested in the central government, which shows that the current “stable growth” policy implemented mainly by local governments has violated the basic laws governing macro-control law. Of course, the fundamental management of the policy of “stabilizing growth” remains to be established by the macro-control law’s subsidiary principle and the dissolution of the vested interest groups in the macro-control decision-making.