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从供应商的角度出发,研究了供应商和客户之间的信息不对称对需求延迟策略的影响。利用标准的委托代理框架对其建模,并根据贝叶斯模型预测需求信息,通过比较供应商在完备信息条件下与信息不对称条件下所提供的最优合同,分析信息不对称程度对供应商最优策略的影响。结果表明,当存在信息不对称时,供应商会增加初始生产力,且由于代理效应,需求延迟策略所产生的部分利润会从供应商转向客户;但当信息不对称程度降低时,代理效应的影响也会逐渐消失。
From the supplier’s point of view, the impact of information asymmetry between suppliers and customers on the demand-delay strategy is studied. It uses the standard principal-agent framework to model it and forecasts the demand information according to the Bayesian model. By comparing the optimal contracts provided by the suppliers under the condition of complete information and information asymmetry, the paper analyzes the degree of information asymmetry to the supply The Impact of Optimal Business Strategy. The results show that when there is information asymmetry, the supplier will increase the initial productivity, and due to the agency effect, the partial profit generated by the demand delaying strategy will shift from the supplier to the customer. However, when the information asymmetry is reduced, the effect of the agent effect Will gradually disappear.