我国尚处在社会主义初级阶段,生产力发展水平不高,且呈多层次状况。因此,在转换企业经营机制,建立现代企业制度中,既要借鉴世界发达国家的有益经验,又要从我国的具体国情出友,进行创新,形成既与国际惯例接轨,又具有中国特色的新型企业制度。 第一,在处理国家与国有企业之间关系上,确立具有中国特色的企业法人财产权,既可以维护公有制的主体地位,又能适应市场经济的要求。在经济体制改革中,如何正确处理国家与国有企业的关系,一直是高难度问题。在传统的计划经济体制下,国家既是企业资产的所自者,又是企业的直接经营者。企业没有自主权,严重地抑制了企业和职工的积极性。党的十一届三中全会后,为了解决企业活力问题,在改革中提出了“两权分离”的措施,即国家拥有所有权,企业拥有经营权。这在处理国家与国有企业的关系问题上迈出了可贵的一步,为增强企业活力创造了条件。但是,在实践中,国家依然可以凭借所有权干预国有企业的生产经营和内部管理,同时也无法摆脱对国有企业承担的无限责任。企业也因没有独立的财产而无法自主经喜、自负盈亏。这就说明,因产权关系模糊,政企仍然难以分开,企业自主权难以真正全面落买。大多数国有企业仍然缺乏活力,国家还肩负着沉重的包袱。产主这种状况的症结,在于没有找 China is still in the primary stage of socialism. The level of productivity development is not high, and it is multi-level. Therefore, in transforming the operating mechanism of enterprises and establishing a modern enterprise system, it is necessary to draw on the useful experience of the developed countries in the world and to make friends from the country’s specific national conditions to innovate, and to form new models that conform to international conventions and have Chinese characteristics. Corporate system. First, in dealing with the relationship between state and state-owned enterprises, establishing a corporate legal person property right with Chinese characteristics can not only maintain the dominant position of public ownership, but also meet the requirements of a market economy. In the economic system reform, how to correctly handle the relationship between the state and state-owned enterprises has always been a difficult issue. Under the traditional planned economy system, the state is not only the owner of corporate assets, but also the direct manager of the enterprise. Enterprises do not have autonomy, which seriously inhibits the enthusiasm of enterprises and employees. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in order to solve the problem of enterprise vitality, the “two-power separation” measure was proposed in the reform. That is, the state owns ownership and the enterprise has the right to operate. This has taken a valuable step in dealing with the relationship between the state and state-owned enterprises, and has created conditions for enhancing the vitality of the enterprise. However, in practice, the state can still intervene in the production management and internal management of state-owned enterprises by virtue of ownership, and at the same time, it cannot escape the unlimited responsibility it bears for state-owned enterprises. Because the company has no independent property, it is unable to self-satisfaction and self-financing. This shows that due to the ambiguity of the property rights relationship, the government and enterprises are still difficult to separate, and the autonomy of enterprises is difficult to fully buy. Most state-owned enterprises still lack dynamism and the country also shoulders heavy burdens. The crux of the situation of the producer is that he has not found