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20世纪30年代初南京国民政府重新恢复传统保甲连坐制度来维持基层社会稳定,但其连坐处罚的制度设计欠系统明确,内部对处罚的轻重存在明显意见分歧,地方往往无所适从,加上国民政府的保甲连坐根本无法改变乡村原有政治生态,保甲这一威胁震慑的传统控制手段落后于中共基于利益满足的基层制度创新,在心理上损害了基层一般民众、地方精英及保甲人员利益,非但没有达到预期效果,反而影响了保甲制度其他职能的发挥。
In the early 1930s, the Nanjing National Government resumed its traditional system of keeping a high pawn in order to maintain social stability at the grass-roots level. However, the systematic design of the sedentary sanctions system was not clearly defined. Internal disagreements existed on the severity of punishments, and local authorities often did not know what to do. The traditional means of control of Baojia, a deterrent to deterrence, have lagged behind that of the grass-roots system based on the interests of the CPC and undermined the interests of grassroots general public, local elites and personnel of the Baojia unit, not only failed to achieve The expected result has, on the contrary, affected the other functions of the Baojia system.