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技术创新的溢出效应造成创新激励不足与社会福利最优的两难抉择。一方面,溢出效应的存在,驱使社会福利达到最大,而创新者福利受损,造成再创新动力不足;另一方面,抑制溢出效应,维持创新者垄断性收益,则损害消费者福利,危及社会福利优化。是否存在一个最优的溢出率调和二者矛盾?或在福利分配标准下,满足一方最优,补偿另一方损失。本文站在创新者与模仿者的角度,尝试在动态最优化和帕累托标准的框架下,通过理论探讨和数理模拟,探寻最优的技术创新溢出率,以权衡创新收益与溢出收益,使社会总收益最大。研究表明,技术创新溢出率无法使创新、模仿及社会收益最大点重合;溢出率随时间的动态变化影响技术溢出量、模仿成本及三方收益;维持社会福利最大的最优溢出率需采取“第三方”补偿机制设计,实施政府事后补偿性组合政策,弥补创新者损失及维系再创新持续。
The spillover effect of technological innovation creates the dilemma of lack of innovation and social welfare. On the one hand, the spillover effect drives the social welfare to the maximum while the innovator’s welfare is impaired, resulting in a lack of renewed impetus. On the other hand, restraining the spillover effect and maintaining the innovator’s monopoly income will undermine consumer welfare and endanger the society Welfare optimization. Is there an optimal spillover rate to reconcile the two contradictions? Or in the welfare allocation criteria, to meet one of the best, compensation for the other party’s loss. From the perspective of innovators and imitators, this paper tries to explore the optimal technological innovation spillover rate through theoretical discussion and mathematical simulation within the framework of dynamic optimization and Pareto standard, in order to weigh the innovation return and spillover return, The largest total social income. The research shows that the spillover rate of technological innovation can not coincide with the innovation, imitation and the social profit maximization. The dynamic change of spillover rate over time affects the technology spillover, imitation cost and tripartite revenue. The optimal spillover rate of social welfare should be “ Third party ”compensation mechanism design, the implementation of government compensatory portfolio policy to make up for the loss of innovators and to maintain and then continue innovation.