代理理论认为,由于较高的债务融资增加了管理者偿还债务的压力,因此,债务融资降低了管理者可以自由支配的公司资源,因而,权力较大的管理者不愿意进行债务融资。本文利用我国股票市场民营上市公司的财务和公司治理数据,实证考察了管理者权力对公司债务融资的影响。实证研究发现,管理者权力较大的民营上市公司具有较低的债务比率,尤其是较低的短期债务比率。因此,本文的研究结果表明,权力较大的管理者具有避免债务融资尤其是短期债务融资的动机。 Agency theory argues that because higher debt financing increases the pressure on managers to pay their debts, debt financing reduces the company’s resources that managers can freely dictate, so that more powerful managers are reluctant to finance debt. In this paper, we use the financial and corporate governance data of private listed companies in the stock market of our country to examine empirically the impact of the power of managers on corporate debt financing. Empirical studies have found that private listed companies with greater managerial power have lower debt ratios, especially lower short-term debt ratios. Therefore, the results of this study show that powerful managers have the incentive to avoid debt financing, especially short-term debt financing.