论文部分内容阅读
财政分权制度既释放地方政府活力,推动地区经济快速增长,也导致地方债务危机。在财政分权体制下,地方政府天然具有举债冲动,博弈分析揭示出,只要中央政府的政策目标需要依靠地方政府通过增加公共支出实现,预算软约束就会发生,博弈结果是中央政府仍会增加对举债地方政府的补贴水平。解决这一问题的最优方案是中央政府可以采取惩罚性政策,通过增加对未举债地方政府的补贴,进而增加举债地方政府所在地区税负,降低官员的晋升概率,达到惩罚效果,从而抵消预算软约束带来的债务融资机会成本下降问题,使地方政府举债的效率达到最优,最大程度减少社会福利损失。
The fiscal decentralization system not only releases the vitality of local governments, promotes the rapid economic growth in the region, but also causes the local debt crisis. Under the fiscal decentralization system, the local government naturally has the debt impulse. The game analysis reveals that as long as the central government’s policy goals need to rely on local governments to increase public spending, the soft budget constraint will occur. As a result, the central government will still increase The level of subsidies for borrowing local governments. The optimal solution to this problem is that the central government can adopt punitive policies to offset the budget by increasing the subsidies for the non-debt-bearing local governments, thereby increasing the tax burden on local governments where borrowings are made, reducing the promotion probability of officials, and achieving the punishment effect Soft debt constraints brought about the opportunity cost of debt financing, so that local governments to maximize the efficiency of debt, to minimize social welfare losses.