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在贝叶斯需求预测更新的情形下,从供需博弈角度探讨了易逝品供应链库存管理的基本问题:什么时间订、订多少以及订货价格如何决定。建立了制造商为主方、零售商为从方的供需Stackelberg博弈模型,其中制造商在低价多量与高价少量之间权衡,零售商在低成本低预测精度与高成本高预测精度之间进行权衡。分析了模型最优解的存在性,设计了两层规划的分段迭代算法,并通过数值例子说明了模型与算法的有效性。进一步,针对Stackelberg博弈中出现的双重边际效应,提出了实现供应链协调的契约形式,论证了实现供应链协调的条件。
In the case of Bayesian demand forecast update, the basic problems of perishable product supply chain inventory management are discussed from the perspective of supply and demand game: when and how much and how the order price will be decided. The Stackelberg game model, where the manufacturer is the master and the retailer is the supplier, is established, in which the manufacturer weighs between the low price and the low price, and retailers carry on the low cost low forecasting accuracy and high cost high forecasting accuracy trade off. The existence of the optimal solution of the model is analyzed. A two-layer sub-interval iterative algorithm is designed. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm. Further, in view of the double marginal effect in Stackelberg game, this paper proposes a contractual form of supply chain coordination and demonstrates the conditions for achieving supply chain coordination.