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本文着重研究以强烈扩张冲动为主要特征的中国地方政府主导型市场经济。①笔者将企业经营者个人控制权理论运用于地方官员,认为官员个人控制权扩张有三条途径,而中国目前地方官员主要运用横向扩张途径以获得自我晋升。中国地方政府强烈的扩张冲动,不同于西方的地方自治和中外历史上的封建诸侯,而是产生于以下全部的必要条件和充分条件:在中国初期市场经济②的特定条件下,必要条件是地方官员横向扩张个人控制权特别强劲的动力,充分条件是地方资源完全的“内公外私”产权③与公共选择制度两者约束的显著失效。
This article focuses on the dominant market economy of local governments in China, which is characterized by a strong expansionary impulse. ① The author applies the theory of personal control of business operators to local officials, believing that there are three ways to expand the individual’s control of officials, while the current local officials in China use horizontal expansion to mainly promote themselves. The strong impulse of expansion by Chinese local governments is different from the local autonomy in Western countries and feudal princes in Chinese and foreign history but arises from all the following necessary and sufficient conditions: Under the special conditions of China’s initial market economy, the necessary conditions are that local Officials expand the power of individual control particularly laterally, and the sufficient conditions are the obvious failure of the constraint of both “public-private property” ③ and public choice system of local resources completely.