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本文针对投资过热现象,以我国A股市场2003~2010年民营上市公司为研究对象,采用基于海洋博弈模型的沙普利-舒贝克权力指数(ShapleyShubik power indices)对上市公司的股权结构进行了重新度量,实证检验了大股东控制权的分散程度与过度投资之间的关系。过度投资水平使用超效率数据包络分析(DEA)法进行测度。本文研究发现:大股东控制权分散程度越大,过度投资水平越高;进一步引入外部审计、法律制度环境等外部监督机制,发现高质量的外部审计和完善的法律制度环境能有效降低大股东控制权分散导致的过度投资,这为探索股东控制权结构对过度投资的影响进一步提供了经验证据的支持。
Aiming at the overheated investment, taking the private listed companies in China’s A-share market from 2003 to 2010 as the research object, the paper uses the Shapley-Shubik power indices based on the ocean game model to re-establish the ownership structure of listed companies Measure, and test empirically the relationship between the decentralization of the controlling shareholder and overinvestment. Overinvestment levels are measured using the Super Efficiency Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. This study finds that the greater the decentralization of control of major shareholders, the higher the level of over-investment. The further introduction of external oversight mechanisms such as external audit and legal system environment and the discovery of high-quality external audit and sound legal environment can effectively reduce the control of large shareholders Over-investment caused by the decentralization of power provides further empirical support for exploring the impact of the structure of shareholder control on overinvestment.