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学者们多以“基于渊源的”来概括法律实证主义关于法律规则有效性之判准的诸论点。为法律规则寻找某种效力性的(非价值的)判准,这一努力在很大程度上源自一个更为基本的问题,即它是法律实证主义科学性努力的必然倾向,如果法律科学或法理学要被看作一门独立自足的学科和专业则必然要求其研究对象的独立性,而发现某种囊括全部法律规则的标准或总的判准,才可能凭借它将法律与非法律区分开。但是,公认的自然法学家如朗.富勒和约翰.菲尼斯等人却都对法律实证主义的法律效力观进行了层层批驳。
Scholars mostly use “based on the origin” to summarize the arguments of legal positivism on the validity of legal rules. The search for some validity (non-value) criteria for the rule of law stems largely from the more fundamental question that it is an inevitable trend of scientific positivism, and that legal science Or jurisprudence to be seen as an independent discipline and profession must necessarily require the independence of its subjects and find some standard or general criterion that encompasses all the rules of law only by virtue of it will law and non-law differentiate. However, recognized natural jurists like Ron Fuller and John Phiness all criticized the legal concept of legal positivism.