论文部分内容阅读
在大规模定制下,产品族定制规划不仅需确定各定制产品的性能定位、还需面对市场价格博弈.考虑制造商对市场的依存、及市场对高质量产品的偏好,分别构建了定制规划的一维和多维扩展Hotelling模型,基于模型的推理、计算与分析,首先证明了在一维产品族定制规划下各制造商可实现价格均衡和性能定位均衡;同时,证实质量因素能驱动均衡性能定位向高端转移,并通过价格博弈、促使制造商定制生产更高质量的产品,故从质量角度诠释了市场不断向高端进化的内部机理;其次,证实了多维产品族定制规划博弈仅存在均衡价格数值解、无全局精确解;最后,基于均衡价格数值解的聚类分析,提出博弈结构均衡概念,证实在多维定制规划中存在博弈结构均衡、并以此有效诠释了价格竞争中“价格维持-价格变更”这一价格循环波动现象的内在运作机理.博弈分析及结论将为企业评估、选择恰当的产品族定制规划策略提供有效决策支持.
Under mass customization, product family customization planning not only needs to determine the performance positioning of customized products, but also face the market price game.Considering the manufacturer’s dependence on the market and the market’s preference for high-quality products, a customized plan Dimensional and multidimensional extension Hotelling model, model-based reasoning, calculation and analysis. First of all, it proves that all manufacturers can achieve price equilibrium and performance positioning equilibrium under the one-dimensional product family customization plan. At the same time, it is proved that quality factors can drive the equilibrium performance positioning Transfer to the high end, and through the price game, prompting manufacturers to customize the production of higher quality products, so from the quality point of view of the market evolving to the high-end internal mechanism; secondly, it is confirmed that the multi-dimensional product family programming game only equilibrium price value In the end, based on the cluster analysis of numerical solution of equilibrium price, the concept of equilibrium of game structure is proposed, which proves that there exists a balanced game structure in multidimensional custom programming, and thus effectively explains the relationship between price maintenance, Price change "The inner working mechanism of the phenomenon of price cycle fluctuations. Game analysis and conclusion Business valuation, select the appropriate product family planning strategies customized to provide effective decision support.