研究了供应链中上下游企业间关于质量成本信息的不对称现象,并由此可能产生的谎报问题.建立了以批发价格契约为基础,同时引入第三方质量成本审查策略的契约机制.结果表明:新的契约形式不但可以消除不对称信息的影响,而且通过审查策略对谎报质量成本信息现象进行了有效的抑制.下游企业可以通过合理的提高批发价格,激励上游企业增加质量成本投入,得到相应较高质量水平的产品,对生产有正向激励作用.最后通过算例验证了相关结论. This paper studies the asymmetry of quality cost information between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain and the possible misleading problem.The contractual mechanism based on the wholesale price contract and the third-party quality cost review strategy is introduced.The results show that : The new form of contract not only can eliminate the influence of asymmetric information but also effectively suppress the information about the quality cost information through the reviewing strategy.The downstream enterprises can stimulate the upstream enterprises to increase the quality cost input by reasonably increasing the wholesale price and get corresponding Higher-quality products have a positive incentive effect on production.Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the relevant conclusions.