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对于东南亚地区新兴民主国家或者正在历经民主化的国家而言,通过宪法改革进程实现文官对安全部队的控制,一直是一项重大挑战。政府试图建立或巩固文官控制体系,但往往会遭遇政变或者政变的威胁。要想把约束安全部队冒险主义的法律条文正式写入宪法,总会要做出各种妥协,多则授予军队相当程度的决策权,少则给予士兵刑事追诉的豁免权。最终,要用宪法把安全部队与政治生活融为一体绝非易事。本文以两个国家为案例,对“有缺陷的民主”(“defective”democracy)问题进行探讨。在这两个案例中,安全部队均已按照文官执政的宪法框架朝向更加融入的格局发展。本研究提出了4个问题。首先,在文官领导的宪政之下,安全部队是怎样实现体制化的?其次,他们的历程有何不同?第三,目前安全部队又在多大程度上被授予各不相同的权限?第四,基于过去的经验,文官控制制度怎样才能长久持续下去呢?本文认为,宪法变更通常应征得安全部队的同意,而不是文职官员们的非正式谈判和妥协。而事后,最初的谈判可能或多或少遭到安全部队的干预,这是基于3个变量:独裁主义传统不改,文官群体相对一致抵制安全部队,以及环境威胁。
For emerging democracies in South-East Asia or countries undergoing democratization, the civilian control of security forces through the constitutional reform process has been a major challenge. The government tries to establish or consolidate a civil control system, but often faces the threat of a coup d’état or a coup d’état. If we want to officially write the legal provisions binding the adventurism of the security forces into the constitution, we will always make various compromises, while giving the military a fair amount of decision-making power and at least give the soldiers a criminal prosecutorial immunity. In the end, it is by no means easy to use the constitution to integrate security forces and political life. This article takes two countries as examples to discuss the issue of “defective ” democracy. In both cases, the security forces have evolved towards a more integrated pattern in accordance with the civilian-ruled constitutional framework. This research raises four questions. First of all, under the civilian-led constitutional government, how are the security forces institutionalized? Secondly, what is the difference between their course of development? Thirdly, to what extent are the security forces currently being given varying degrees of authority? Fourthly, Based on past experience, how can the civil control system last for a long time? This paper argues that constitutional changes should usually be approved by the security forces rather than informal negotiations and compromises by civilian officials. Afterwards, the initial negotiations may be more or less interfered with by the security forces. This is based on three variables: the tradition of authoritarianism is not changed, the civilian population relatively opposes the security forces, and environmental threats.