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在渠道成员联合促销且存在双边道德风险下,考察了制造商对零售价和批发价的决策问题,指出双边道德风险下的最优市场价格应低于无道德风险下的对应价格。分析了市场潜在需求和价格敏感系数等外生变量对定价决策的影响,指出最优市场价格和最优批发价格随市场潜在需求的增加而增加,随价格敏感系数的增大而减小。最后运用数值分析对文中结论进行了验证。
Under the joint promotion of channel members and the existence of bilateral moral hazard, the manufacturer’s decision-making on retail price and wholesale price is investigated. The optimal market price under bilateral moral hazard should be lower than the corresponding price under the non-moral risk. The influence of exogenous variables such as market potential demand and price sensitivity coefficient on pricing decision is analyzed. It is pointed out that the optimal market price and the optimal wholesale price increase with the increase of potential market demand, and decrease with the increase of price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusion in this paper.