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政策性能繁母猪保险是我国政府稳定生猪市场和养猪收入的主要举措之一,但在政策性能繁母猪保险实施过程中,农户存在各种类型的骗保骗赔行为,这严重限制了能繁母猪保险基本功能的发挥。文章通过建立动态博弈模型,对农户、兽医以及保险公司等相关利益主体在交易中的行为进行分析比较,找出影响农户和兽医合谋的主要因素,发现可以通过创新合作模式提高监管主体积极性、落实推广耳标技术以建立动态信息管理系统、加强对兽医的管理并加大奖惩力度以及修改完善定损原则等方面有效减少农户的欺诈行为。
Policy performance Fan sow insurance is one of the main measures for stabilizing live pig market and raising pig income in our country. However, there are various types of peasant household fraud and cheating in the implementation of policy and performance sow insurance, which severely limits Can sow the basic functions of insurance play. By establishing a dynamic game model, the article analyzes and compares the behavior of the relevant stakeholders such as farmers, veterinarians and insurance companies during the transaction to find out the main factors that affect the collusion between farmers and veterinarians. It is found that the motivation of the regulatory body can be improved through innovative cooperation mode, Promote ear tag technology to establish a dynamic information management system, strengthen the management of veterinarians and increase rewards and punishments, as well as modify and perfect the principle of fixed loss and so reduce farmers’ fraud effectively.