中国证券市场投资者保护的现实状况,并不符合经济学界关于法院对金融市场发展起着重要作用的基本理论判断,相反却是存在“司法失灵”的现象。基于从市场机制、行政监管机制和司法机制这三者的复合视角去探讨证券市场国家监管权力配置格局的问题,新兴的一项金融学理论——不完备法律学说阐释了证券市场上国家权力最优配置的观点并试图对为什么会出现“司法弱势”这一客观现象进行了解释,但是这一理论既有无法克服的内在逻辑性矛盾,同时又无法对中国证券市场的现实权力结构提供足够的解释力。事实上,在处于经济转型大环境之下的中国证券市场上,是国家的政治性资源调动而非监管者的依法监管活动作为一项替代机制承担了“司法失灵”条件下的投资者权益保护的职能。 The actual situation of investor protection in China’s securities market does not conform to the basic theoretical judgment of the economists that courts should play an important role in the development of financial markets. On the contrary, there is a phenomenon of “judicial failure.” Based on the complex perspective of market mechanism, administrative supervision mechanism and judicial mechanism, this paper discusses the allocation of national regulatory power in securities market. A new theory of finance - incomplete legal theory illustrates that the state power in securities market is the most But also attempts to explain why there is an objective phenomenon of “judicial weakness.” However, this theory has both insurmountable inherent logical contradictions and can not provide the real power structure of China’s securities market Sufficient explanatory power. In fact, under the environment of economic restructuring, China’s securities market is the country’s political resource mobilization rather than the supervisory activities of regulators as an alternative mechanism to assume the “judicial failure” under the conditions of investors The protection of rights and interests of the function.