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建筑节能服务产业是推动我国既有建筑节能改造工作的重要组成部分,然而目前建筑节能服务质量有待提高和市场需求不足阻碍了建筑节能服务公司(Energy Service Company,简称ESCO)的发展。运用进化博弈理论,建立无政府奖励和有政府奖励条件下参与节能改造的ESCO与业主复制动态模型,分析其行为的动态演变过程,探讨其博弈结果的稳定性。研究得出结论:政府前期激励政策可促进节能服务主体积极参与到节能服务市场中;后期主要通过合适的奖励额度引导市场主体提高节能服务质量,为市场健康有序发展提供保障。最后提出促进建筑节能服务公司发展的措施。
Building energy-saving service industry is to promote China’s existing building energy-saving renovation an important part, but at present the quality of building energy-saving services to be improved and the lack of market demand has hindered the development of the Energy Services Company (Energy Service Company, referred to as ESCO). The evolutionary game theory is used to establish the dynamic model of ESCO and the owners involved in energy-saving reform under the condition of no-government incentives and government incentives. The dynamic evolution of the behaviors and the stability of the game results are discussed. The conclusion is that the pre-government incentive policies can promote the main energy-saving service providers to actively participate in the energy-saving service market; the latter mainly guide the market players to improve the quality of energy-saving services through appropriate incentive quotas and guarantee the healthy and orderly development of the market. Finally, it puts forward measures to promote the development of building energy service companies.