The multichannel pricing has been a puzzle for lots of firms involved in both online and offline business.Some firms operating across differentiated channels commit uniform pricing in both channels while others utilize differentiated pricing to improve profitability.In this paper,we incorporate peer-induced price fairness concerns into a three-player(pure online firm,pure offline firm and hybrid firm)competition model.We find that(1)when price fairness concerns are absent,hybrid firm can always benefit from differentiated pricing;(2)when price fairness concerns are present,in spite of the decreasing total demand,hybrid firm optimally conducts price discrimination across channels when price fairness concerns are relatively low.As the consumers price fairness concerns increase,the hybrid firm successfully coordinates the channels by intensifying(mitigating)the competition within the niche(no niche)channel in which the disutility associated with the mismatch is relatively high(low)and shifts the demand from no niche(niche)channel to the other channel.Interestingly,we also find that price fairness concerns would damage rather than benefiting consumer surplus as we have expected.We also discuss how the results would change when taking into account consumers incentive to switch across channels.