It is widely accepted that we bear special responsibilities to those who are vulnerable,especially those who are vulnerable to our actions and choices.However,exactly who fall under the category of the vulnerable? What special responsibilities do we have toward them,and on what ground? These are the main questions this paper attempts to address.The question of who fall under the category of the vulnerable is a conceptual one.A satisfactory account of the category in question requires not only that it should be able to fix the extension of the ‘vulnerable’ but also that it be able to provide some reasons for ascribing vulnerability.Otherwise,‘vulnerability’ functions no more than a label.The question of what special responsibilities we have toward the vulnerable is different from the above question in nature.This question is a moral one whose answer depends on the truth or rational acceptance of some moral propositions whose justification in turn requires defending some moral perspective by means of which the truth or rational acceptance of the moral propositions can be explained.Some people attempt to explain the truth or rational acceptance of the moral propositions in terms of justice.In what follows,however,I shall argue that justice cannot fully account for the widely held moral intuition that we have special moral responsibilities to the vulnerable people.As result,we need to go beyond justice and explore some other ground for it.In the paper,it will be argued that the Confucian moral perspective has ethical resources beyond justice to explain the moral intuition in question.It should be noted,however,that my discussion will be confined to the context of health care and will reference to the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 2005.