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本文基于第二类代理理论框架,以第一大股东控制权私人收益为核心概念建立模型说明了主并公司股权结构对于其并购决策的影响。本文的模型将大股东的私人收益内生化为其持股比例的函数,在不确定环境下讨论了第一大股东持股比例和股权集中度对并购决策的影响。本文的模型为第二类代理理论背景下公司并购的实证文献提供了一定的理论支持。
This paper is based on the second type of agency theoretical framework, and establishes the model based on the core concept of the first shareholder’s private benefit of control, which illustrates the influence of the ownership structure of the main company on its M&A decision. The model of this article will endogenize the private shareholder’s private earnings as a function of its shareholding percentage, and discuss the influence of the largest shareholder’s shareholding percentage and shareholding concentration on M&A decisions in an uncertain environment. This model provides some theoretical support for the empirical literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions in the context of the second type of agency theory.