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本文层层递进地分析了会计信息、公司治理与会计准则的相互关系。首先,本文分析了立足于公司治理背景的会计信息披露的逻辑,并针对会计信息在公司治理中的作用,借助于典型的历史事件进行史证研究,对会计信息作为一种“公共知识”的功效进行了进一步的解释。其次,本文围绕不同企业之间和投资者之间对于会计信息披露进行博弈分析,得出了如下的结论:①不同质的企业之间,针对稀缺性的资源展开的争夺,最终必然促使企业的会计信息公开披露,使得会计信息披露成为一种非正式的制度安排;②分析了伴随着企业组织形态的多元化和所有权分享所导致的企业会计信息披露的变迁特征; ③对于股权分散的股份有限公司和上市公司,寄希望于投资者和管理当局之间签订私人契约来要求高质量的信息披露,逐渐成为不可能;为此,需要会计准则作为一种公共契约的存在。接下来,本文对美国制定会计准则初期围绕会计准则制定权的争夺,构建了一个博弈的分析框架,为会计准则制定权最终由 SEC 下放给民间准则制定机构提供了一种更一般性的解释。最后,本文借助于一个简单的模型对公司治理生态与会计信息质量之间的关系给出概括和总结。
The paper analyzes the relationship between accounting information, corporate governance and accounting standards progressively. First of all, this paper analyzes the logic of accounting information disclosure based on the background of corporate governance. In view of the role of accounting information in corporate governance, it conducts historical evidence research with typical historical events and regards accounting information as a kind of “public knowledge ”The effectiveness of a further explanation. Secondly, this article focuses on the game analysis of accounting information disclosure between different enterprises and investors, and draws the following conclusions: ① The competition between different qualitative enterprises for scarcity of resources will inevitably lead enterprises The public disclosure of accounting information makes the disclosure of accounting information an informal institutional arrangement; (2) the changing characteristics of corporate accounting information disclosure caused by the diversification of corporate organizational form and the sharing of ownership are analyzed; (3) Companies and listed companies, placing their hopes on the private contract between investors and regulatory authorities to request high-quality disclosure of information, have become impossible; for this reason, the need for accounting standards as a public contract exists. In the following, the dissertation attempts to establish a game analysis framework for the United States’ initial scramble for enactment of accounting standards, which provides a more general explanation for the decentralization of accounting standards from the SEC to the norm-setting organizations. Finally, this paper gives a summary and summary of the relationship between corporate governance ecology and accounting information quality by means of a simple model.