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以中国沪、深两市1999~2012年上市公司为研究对象,研究了董事会规模如何影响企业风险承担以及产权性质和市场化进程对上述关系的调节作用。研究表明:规模较大的董事会对极端决策更难达成一致,倾向于选择风险相对较小的项目,董事会规模与企业风险承担显著负相关。与非国有控股公司相比,国有控股公司董事会的决策权力有限,其董事会规模对企业风险承担的负向影响也相对较小。市场化进程的改善能够增强董事会成员对企业风险承担价值的认识,降低群体决策的沟通与协调成本,便于董事会成员对企业风险承担决策达成一致,进而减弱董事会规模对企业风险承担的负向影响。
Taking the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China from 1999 to 2012 as the research object, this paper studies how the size of the board of directors affects the corporate risk exposure and the regulatory role of the nature of the ownership and the marketization process on these relations. The research shows that it is more difficult for the larger board to reach an agreement on the extreme decision-making, preferring to choose the project with relatively small risk, and the scale of the board of directors has a significant negative correlation with the corporate risk appetite. Compared with non-state-controlled companies, the state-owned holding company’s board of directors has limited power to make decisions and the negative influence of its board size on corporate risk appetite is relatively small. The improvement of the marketization process can enhance the understanding of board members on the value of corporate risk-taking, reduce the communication and coordination costs of group decision-making, facilitate the board members to agree on the corporate risk-taking decision, and further reduce the negative influence of board size on corporate risk-taking.