在当代英美分析哲学竭力拒斥乃至取消内在心理世界的背景下,戴维森却尝试恢复用主体意向解释行动这一古老的行动哲学传统。为实现此目标,他提出了事件本体论的核心主张。在事件本体论中,戴维森一方面从个别事件的时空区域化本质出发,坚持唯物主义的物理性世界立场;另一方面又在区分事件本身与事件描述的前提下,通过把心理摹状词视作心理事件标签的方式,赋予内在心理世界存在的合法性,以及利用心理性事件解释物理性行为的合法性。在事件本体论的视域下,戴维森的行动哲学看似调和了决定论与自由意志、科学世界观与常识心理学、唯物主义与二元论之间的对立,但最终却因心理事件的语言学特质与诉诸心理解释的工具主义方法论,陷入心理副现象论、目的论因果观以及非命题态度等问题的困境中。 In the context of contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy, who tried to reject or even eliminate the inner world of psychology, Davidson tried to resume the ancient philosophical and behavioral tradition of explaining action with subjectivity. To achieve this goal, he put forward the core proposition of ontology. On the ontology of events, on the one hand, Davidson, proceeding from the nature of space-time regionalization of individual events, adheres to the materialistic physical world standpoint; on the other hand, under the premise of distinguishing the event itself from the event description, As a way of labeling psychological events, giving legitimacy to the inner mental world, and using psychological events to explain the legitimacy of physical behavior. From the perspective of event ontology, Davidson’s action philosophy seems to reconcile the antinomy between determinism and free will, science world outlook and common-sense psychology, materialism and dualism, but ultimately due to the linguistic traits of psychological events and Resorting to the instrumentalist methodology of psychological explanation, falling into the predicament of psychological side phenomena, teleological causal view, and non-propositional attitude.