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本文以创业板上市公司为研究样本,从薪酬契约和代理成本的视角,检验了顾客集中与管理层治理的关系。实证分析结果显示,顾客集中度与高管薪酬和代理成本存在显著负相关关系。结果表明:顾客集中显著影响公司薪酬契约,顾客集中降低了高管薪酬;顾客集中降低代理成本,减轻管理层代理冲突问题。这些研究结论丰富了公司治理的理论内容,同时对于缓解公司代理冲突、改善公司治理矛盾具有重要的现实意义。
In this paper, the GEM-listed companies as a sample of the study, from the perspective of pay contract and agency costs, test the relationship between customer concentration and management governance. Empirical analysis shows that there is a significant negative correlation between customer concentration and executive compensation and agency costs. The results show that: the concentration of customers significantly affects the corporate pay contract, customers focus on reducing executive compensation; customers focus on reducing agency costs and reduce management agency conflicts. These findings enrich the theoretical content of corporate governance, meanwhile, it has important practical significance for alleviating the conflict of corporate agency and improving the corporate governance.