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针对现有文献大多忽视技术被许可方的议价能力问题,在一个双边垄断的框架之内,运用轮流出价的讨价还价模型,讨论了技术许可的价格契约.研究表明,当双方的时间贴现率反映各自议价成本的高低时,双方议价成本的相对大小决定其讨价还价的能力,也决定了各自对新增利润的分割;同时,说明了技术许可方拥有全部议价能力只是讨价还价模型的一种极端情形.模型对现实更有解释力,拓展了现有的研究思路.
The existing literature mostly ignores the issue of the bargaining power of technology licensees. Within the framework of a bilateral monopoly, the bargaining model of bargaining bidding is used to discuss the price contract for technology licensing. Research shows that when the time discount rates of both parties reflect the respective When the bargaining cost is high or low, the relative size of the bargaining cost of both parties determines their bargaining power, and also determines their respective division of new profits. At the same time, it shows that the technology licensor has all the bargaining power is only an extreme case of the bargaining model. It is more explanatory to reality and expands existing research ideas.