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证明LuRongbo等人的代理签名方案(Proc.of the 8th ACIS International Conferenceon Software Engineering,Artificial Intelligence,Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing,2007)不能抵抗替换公钥攻击和恶意但被动的密钥生成中心(KGC)攻击,普通攻击者可通过替换公钥伪造出有效的代理签名,KGC通过恶意但被动的KGC攻击可获得用户的私钥,从而能任意伪造出有效的代理签名。针对替换公钥攻击和KGC攻击,提出一个改进方案,新方案满足代理签名的安全性要求,能有效抵抗替换公钥攻击和恶意但被动的KGC攻击。
It is proved that LuRongbo et al.’s Proxy Signature Scheme (Proc. Of the 8th ACIS International Conferenceon Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel / Distributed Computing, 2007) can not resist the substitution of public key attacks and malicious but passive key generation centers (KGCs) Attack, ordinary attackers can forge a valid proxy signature by replacing the public key. KGC can obtain the user’s private key through a malicious but passive KGC attack, so that any valid proxy signature can be faked arbitrarily. Aiming at replacing public key attack and KGC attack, an improved scheme is proposed. The new scheme meets the security requirements of proxy signature and can effectively resist the replacement of public key attack and malicious but passive KGC attack.