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有关理性秘密共享的研究指出,若参与者是想要最大化个人利益的理性参与者,则将无动机在协议中共享份额,从而导致秘密共享的失败.本文研究内容是,在秘密共享中,n个参与者是理性参与者或者是行为任意的恶意参与者.先前考虑恶意参与者的理性秘密共享的相关研究都需要广播信道,这在现实中是很难实现的.本文给出的理性秘密共享方案首次做到了能够在标准信道下抵抗恶意敌手.方案通过多轮交互,真实轮未知的机制,导致偏离的收益不会比遵循协议的收益高,从而使得理性参与者不会选择偏离协议.在协议进行中,方案使用可验证的随机函数来检测恶意参与者的偏离,同时使用基于拜占庭一致的广播协议来对此偏离达成一致并在后续协议中屏蔽该参与者,从而避免了恶意参与者的持续伤害.同时给出了一种新的均衡概念,即计算意义下关于敌手结构的序贯均衡,并给出了相关证明.在此均衡概念衡量下,恶意敌手不能阻止理性参与者重组秘密,而且对于恶意敌手的任意行为,理性参与者没有动机去偏离协议,保证了协议的顺利进行.
The research on the sharing of rational secrets indicates that if the participants are rational participants who want to maximize their personal interests, they will have no motive to share their shares in the agreement, which leads to the failure of the secret sharing.The content of this paper is that in the secret sharing, n participants are rational participants or arbitrary malicious actors.Previous studies of rational secret sharing of malicious participants require broadcast channels, which in reality is very difficult to achieve.In this paper, the rational secrets For the first time, the sharing scheme can resist malicious opponents under the standard channel.The scheme does not choose to deviate from the protocol because the scheme does not receive more revenue than the protocol-based one through multiple rounds of interaction and unknown mechanism of the real round. In the course of the protocol, the scheme uses a verifiable random function to detect the deviation of malicious participants while using the Byzantine-based broadcast protocol to agree on this discrepancy and mask the participant in subsequent protocols, thereby avoiding malicious participants .At the same time, a new concept of equilibrium is given, that is, the sequential mean And gives the relevant evidence. In this concept of a balanced measure, malicious adversary can not prevent the rational reorganization of the participants secret, but also for any malicious behavior rival, rational actors have no incentive to deviate from the agreement, to ensure the smooth progress of the agreement.