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本文在拓展卢克斯“权力维度”概念的基础上,构建了政治域中的主观博弈模型和不同域之间的演化博弈模型来探讨公共行政模式演化的一般路径,并通过分析公共行政模式演化路径背后政府与公民及官僚两两博弈,得出权力维度背后公共行政模式演化的一般规律:随着政治域中政府与公民及官僚间内在博弈规则的改变和不同域中共时性关联和历时性关联的演化,政府对公民及官僚权力维度将向纵深化发展。最后,提出了公共行政模式演化规律的几个命题及其对我国行政模式改革与发展的启示。
On the basis of expanding the concept of “power dimension”, this paper constructs the subjective game model in the political domain and the evolutionary game model between different domains to explore the general path of the evolution of the public administration model. Behind the pattern evolution path Government and citizens and bureaucrats play a two-game, come to power behind the general pattern of evolution of public administration model: With the change of the rules of internal game between government and citizens and bureaucrats in the political domain, The evolution of diachronic correlations will deepen the government’s dimensions of civil and bureaucratic power. Finally, several propositions on the evolution rule of public administration mode and its enlightenment on the reform and development of our country’s administration mode are put forward.