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基于投资者有限关注理论,考察了企业社会责任对年报披露时机的影响及产生的经济后果,发现当公司披露的年报是坏消息时,社会责任评级较好的企业选择在投资者关注不足时进行信息披露的概率较高,导致私人信息无法通过其交易行为融入资产定价过程中,股价波动呈现出较强的同步性。这一结果表明,社会责任评级较好的企业会根据投资者的关注状态差异择机进行盈余公告,以转移投资者对坏消息的注意力,从而降低股价的信息效率。
Based on the limited attention theory of investors, this paper examines the impact of corporate social responsibility on the disclosure timing of annual reports and the economic consequences, and finds that when the annual reports disclosed by the company are bad news, the enterprises with better social responsibility ratings choose to do so when the investors are concerned about the lack of attention The higher probability of information disclosure, resulting in private information can not be incorporated into the asset pricing process through its trading behavior, the stock price volatility showed a strong synchronization. This result shows that companies with better social responsibility ratings will make earnings announcements based on differences in investors ’concerns, so as to divert investors’ attention from bad news and reduce the information efficiency of stock prices.