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通过分析正式合同与非正式协议的文本可以发现,任意一张契约的菜单内容都可提炼为参与人、标的、条款三个要素。参与人的信息结构、行为品行和标的专用性导致交易冲突,而条款实质上是一种化解代理风险、不适应、套牢等交易冲突的私人秩序治理结构,包含激励、协调、权威三个维度。在特定的交易中,参与人的行为品行和标的专用性相对稳定,交易冲突水平取决于信息结构和治理结构。给定交易冲突水平,最小交易费用出现在信息结构和治理结构的边际交易费用效应相等时。在建构契约结构模型的基础上,经连续的边际分析可以发现,契约多样性源于契约结构的不同均衡状态,而契约均衡结构是交易费用与交易福利的权衡结果,并将因制度环境的介入而发生改变。
By analyzing the texts of formal contracts and informal agreements, it can be found that the menu contents of any contract can be refined into the three elements of participant, subject matter and clause. The participants’ information structure, behavioral conduct and standard specificity lead to transaction conflicts. The provision is essentially a private order governance structure that resolves transaction risks such as agency risk, incommensurability and jail time, and includes the three dimensions of motivation, coordination and authority. In a particular transaction, participants’ behaviors and standards are relatively stable. The level of transaction conflict depends on the information structure and governance structure. Given the level of transactional conflicts, the minimum transaction costs arise when the marginal transaction costs of the information and governance structures are equal. Based on the construction of the contract structure model, through continuous marginal analysis, it can be found that the diversification of contract origins from different equilibrium conditions of the contractual structure. The contractual equilibrium structure is the trade-off between transaction costs and transaction welfare. And due to the involvement of institutional environment Change.