在古诺模型的基础上，从策略相互作用的角度分析了横向合并的部分动因。推出了在单纯的古诺竞争中，为获得市场力量进行横向合并的厂商是不盈利的，但当规模效益达到一定条件时合并可获得盈利。得出了生产能力约束成为合并的潜在动力，而且生产能力高的厂商之间更容易发生合并。 On the basis of the Cournot model, some motives of horizontal combination are analyzed from the perspective of strategic interaction. Launched in a purely Cournot competition, vendors that are horizontal mergers to gain market power are not profitable, but the merger is profitable when the economies of scale meet certain conditions. It concludes that the constraint of productive capacity becomes the potential driving force of the merger, and the merger is more likely to occur among the manufacturers with higher production capacity.