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具身的认知观认为,人类的心智和理性是具身的。从维果茨基活动理论传统的视角出发,通过对莱考夫和约翰逊的“典型例子”以及西伦和史密斯的动力认知案例的分析,对认知语言学中发展起来的两种具身认知主张进行了批判。论证了具身的认知观并没有能够推翻“认知是一个在认识上独立存在的客观属性的过程”这样一种物理主义观点,并进一步揭示了具身的认知观所面临的物理主义困境。
With the cognitive perspective that the human mind and reason are specific. From the perspective of the tradition of Vygotsky’s theory of activity, through the analysis of the “typical examples” of Lakoff and Johnson and the power cognition cases of Xileng and Smith, two kinds of cognitive linguistics Personal cognition advocated a critique. It is argued that the cognitive view of the individual has not been able to overthrow the view that “the process of cognition is an objective property that exists independently in cognition” and further reveals the cognitive perspective Physicalistic dilemma.