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反倾销政策为外国企业关税跳跃直接投资提供了激励机制。本文运用博弈思想和方法分析了4种反倾销措施对外国企业进入市场模式的影响,并在此基础上研究了进口国政府在生产者利益最大化或国民福利最大化两种替代目标下时以产品或直接投资两种进入战略的政策反应。本文的最终分析结论是：外国企业市场进入模式选择既受投资固定成本的影响,同时也依赖于政府所采用的政策工具；进口国反倾销政策抉择,既要根据外国企业预期进入战略而变化,又要受政府目标函数的制约。
Anti-dumping policies provide an incentive mechanism for foreign enterprises to jump on tariff-based direct investments. This paper analyzes the impact of four kinds of anti-dumping measures on the market entry mode of foreign enterprises by game theory and method. On the basis of this, this paper studies the influence of importing anti-dumping measures on the entry of products by the government of the importing country under the two alternatives of maximizing the interests of the producer or the national welfare. Or direct investment into the two policy responses to the strategy. The final analysis conclusion of this paper is: the choice of market entry mode of foreign enterprises is affected not only by the fixed cost of investment but also by the policy tools adopted by the government. The choice of anti-dumping policy by importing countries should not only change according to the expected entry strategy of foreign enterprises, To be subject to the government objective function constraints.