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本文研究了网络广告定价问题,建立零售商和网络广告商的微分博弈模型,其中零售商决定产品的销售价格,网络广告商决定网站运营努力水平,广告点击价格经二者谈判决定。首先通过微分博弈方法求得给定网络广告点击价格下零售商与网络广告商的均衡策略,最后借助合作博弈纳什讨价还价模型求解不同谈判能力下的广告定价策略。研究发现:(1)网站运作努力水平与广告点击价格正相关;(2)最优广告单位点击价格与零售商谈判能力负相关;(3)零售商利润与自身谈判能力正相关,与自身品牌商誉衰减系数负相关,网站利润与零售商谈判能力、点击量衰减系数负相关。
This paper studies the issue of online advertisement pricing and establishes the game model of difference between retailers and online advertisers. The retailer decides the selling price of the product, the level of efforts of online advertisers in deciding the website’s operation, and the price of clicks. Firstly, the equilibrium strategy of retailers and online advertisers under a given online advertising click-through price is obtained through the method of differential game. Finally, the ad-hoc game of Nash bargaining model is used to solve the advertising pricing strategy under different bargaining power. The research found that: (1) the level of website operation effort is positively correlated with the click-through price of advertisement; (2) the click-through price of the best ad unit is negatively correlated with retailers’ negotiation ability; (3) retailer profit is positively correlated with its own negotiation ability; Goodwill decay coefficient is negatively correlated, website profit is negatively correlated with retailer negotiation ability and traffic volume attenuation coefficient.