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借助模拟实验,区分并比较了高收入者与中低收入者在不同税收执法策略下的税收遵从效果。实证分析表明:在影响纳税人遵从的各执法因素中,查获率对高收入个人的税收遵从度有着最为显著的威慑,处罚率和激励也与之正相关,但处罚率的影响并不显著;在税收执法的联合策略中,实施威慑与激励并用的“奖惩”组合对纳税人遵从的影响要普遍优于其他组合。因此,要最大程度地提高高收入者的税收遵从度,应当着力调整、优化当前税收执法策略,在着重提高高收入者税收不遵从查获率的基础上,构建威慑与激励有效结合的最优执法组合。
By means of simulation experiments, the tax compliance effects of high-income earners and middle-low income earners under different tax law enforcement strategies are distinguished and compared. Empirical analysis shows that among the law enforcement factors that affect the compliance of taxpayers, the detection rate has the most significant deterrent to the tax compliance of high-income individuals. The penalty rate and incentive are also positively correlated with the tax compliance rate, but the impact of the penalty rate is not significant. In the joint tax enforcement law enforcement, the combination of deterrence and incentive and the combination of “rewards and punishments” are generally superior to other combinations for taxpayer compliance. Therefore, in order to maximize the tax compliance of high-income earners, efforts should be made to adjust and optimize the current tax law enforcement strategies. On the basis of focusing on improving the investigation rate of high-income tax non-compliance, we should construct the optimal law enforcement system in which deterrence and incentive are effectively combined combination.