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跨行政区流域水污染政策博弈模型表明:地方政府对环保部门的环境执法有重要影响,在区域利益冲突、信息不对称和缺乏激励机制的情况下,地方政府很难真正执行中央政府的治理政策;如果中央政府加大对地方政府的问责力度,可能使地方政府面临巨大的经济发展压力而不得不对本行政区的污染进行治理。为实现跨行政区流域水污染的良好治理,有必要对条块分割的环境管理体制进行调整,改变地方政府的利益偏好,通过采取承诺行动提高中央政府的政策效率和置信度,建立跨行政区流域水污染协同治理机制实现流域生态质量改善的政策目标。
The game model of water pollution policy across the basin shows that the local government has an important influence on the environmental enforcement of environmental protection departments. In the case of regional conflicts of interest, information asymmetry and lack of incentive mechanism, it is very difficult for local governments to implement the governance policies of the central government. If the central government increases its accountability to local governments, it may cause the local governments to face tremendous economic development pressures and thus have to govern the pollution in their own administrative regions. In order to realize good governance of water pollution across the basin, it is necessary to adjust the fragmented environmental management system, change the interest preference of local governments, and to increase the efficiency and confidence level of the central government through policy of commitment, Collaborative Governance Mechanisms to Achieve Policy Objectives for Improving Ecological Quality in Drainage Basin.