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本文研究对象是不完全信息下搜索引擎基于GSP拍卖的竞价排名问题。基于静态博弈模型,首先给出了按点击付费情况下广告商的贝叶斯均衡出价函数;其次为了保证均衡存在,给出了关于点击率的充分条件,并分析了点击率与均衡存在的关系;最后分析了点击率变化对搜索引擎收益的影响。结果对不完全信息下广告商的出价策略和搜索引擎的广告位置拍卖策略提供了决策依据。
The research object of this paper is the incomplete ranking of search engine based on GSP auctions. Based on the static game model, firstly, the advertiser’s Bayesian equilibrium bidding function under the case of pay-per-click is given. Secondly, in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium, the sufficient condition about the click-through rate is given and the relationship between click-through rate and equilibrium is analyzed Finally, it analyzes the impact of the change of click rate on the revenue of search engine. The result provides a decision-making basis for the advertiser’s bidding strategy under incomplete information and the search engine’s advertising position auction strategy.