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考虑有限理性消费者的前提下研究了低质和高质零售商关于退款保证的策略竞争。进一步将模型扩展到存在产品质量差异的情形,研究产品质量对双方策略的影响。研究表明:只有当有限理性消费者数量高于一定临界值时,提供退款保证才是有利可图的。在产品质量对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面为同时提供退款保证,且此时退款保证对低质企业更有利;而在产品质量非对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面可能为低质企业不提供,高质企业提供或双方同时提供。此时退款保证更倾向于对高质企业有利。
Under the premise of considering the bounded rationality consumer, we study the strategic competition of the low-quality and high-quality retailers on the money-back guarantee. Further expand the model to the existence of product quality differences in the situation, study the impact of product quality on both strategies. Research shows that it is only profitable to provide a money back guarantee when the number of bounded rationality consumers is above a certain critical value. In the market where product quality is symmetrical, the retailer’s rebate guarantee is balanced by providing a refund guarantee at the same time. In this case, the refund guarantee is more advantageous to the low-quality enterprise. In the market with asymmetric product quality, The balance of money back guarantee may not be provided by low-quality enterprises, provided by high-quality enterprises or provided by both parties at the same time. At this point the money back guarantee is more advantageous to high-quality enterprises.