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从危机管理及其绩效而言,日本在核事故发生前,未能从体制、机制、法制和预案等方面“避免事故发生”;在紧急处置中,未能“阻止坏事变得更坏”;在事故发生后,未能“将坏事转变为好事”。追问福岛核事故及其危机管理可得到以下五点启示:一是风险偏好选择奠定了发生“福岛核事故”的逻辑基础。二是“国策民营”模式造就了核电公司的逐利属性。三是模糊化的管理体制成为了政企利益勾连的温床。四是政治的过度介入将招致“管理危机”与“技术危机”。五是重大核事故的特点决定了只凭一国之力仍难以应对与管控。
From the perspective of crisis management and its performance, Japan failed to “prevent accidental occurrence” from the aspects of system, mechanism, legal system and plan before the nuclear accident happened. In emergency disposal, it failed to “prevent the bad things from becoming more Bad ”after the accident, failed to“ turn bad things into good things. ” Fukushima nuclear accident and its crisis management can get the following five lessons: First, the choice of risk appetite laid the “Fukushima nuclear accident,” the logical basis. Second, “national policy private ” model created a profit-driven property of nuclear power companies. Third, the fuzzy management system has become a hotbed of the interests of the government and enterprises. Fourth, excessive political intervention will lead to “management crisis” and “technological crisis.” Fifth, the characteristics of a major nuclear accident have decided that it is still hard to cope with and control the power of a country alone.